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UNEP’s proposal of the green economy advocates the pricing of ecosystem 
services in the hope of providing greater environmental protection and eradicating 
poverty. There are five aspects of the green economy which could undermine its 
practical implementation as well as its social legitimacy; i) ecosystem services are 
inherently difficult to price, ii) the consideration of the rebound effect is 
insufficient, iii) primacy of economics over the environment is ensured, iv) markets 
offer little protection for the poorest people, and v) existing market mechanisms 
aimed at safeguarding the environment have not succeeded. The green economy relies 
upon the discursive power of ecological modernization and our faith in progress to 
uphold a failing strategy of unfettered economic growth. This discourse limits our 
capacity to conceive solutions outside the economic sphere. Achieving sustainable 
development will require a process of social change that could be facilitated by the 
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1. The Future We Want? 
 
The 2012 Rio + 20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD) has resulted in a disappointing and rather vague outcome document. A 
brief look at some of the words used most frequently in the text tells you everything 
you need to know. ‘Voluntary’ appears eleven times, as opposed to (legally) ‘binding’ 
which is used only once (UNCSD, 2012). ‘Reaffirm’ occurs fifty-nine times, which in 
itself is not so interesting until you compare it to the use of ‘binding’. It seems that 
plenty of good ideas have emerged from the various UN initiatives over the last forty 
years, but most nations are not enthusiastic about the prospect of implementing 
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them. Perhaps most enlightening is the use of the term ‘sustained growth’, which the 
delegates pledged to pursue no less than sixteen times (ibid). World leaders regard 
sustained growth as the principle means of achieving sustainable development, or ‘the 
future we want’. Alternative policies, such as conservation, regulation and 
enforcement, and wealth re-distribution, have been left on the shelf for now. 
At the risk of getting embroiled in semantics, it is important to clarify what is 
meant by sustained growth. It is, quite simply, “economic growth, in perpetuity”. 
Sustained growth is a surprisingly transparent term that removes much of the ambiguity 
over how leading politicians interpret sustainable development. For anyone concerned 
about the dimension of social justice in this new policy, it is conveniently handled by 
the insertion “sustained and inclusive growth”. So now we have it: “continuous 
economic growth, for everyone”. This may sound ominous to you. Unfettered 
economic growth is the destructive force that got us into this mess, and now it has 
become the primary instrument in our efforts to get us out of it (Monbiot, 2012). 
The problem is redefined as the solution. 
The green economy is the strategic tool proposed by the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) in their paper Towards a Green Economy – Pathways to 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (2011), which set the agenda for Rio + 
20. The green economy aims to direct nations away from harmful modes of 
production and consumption, a so-called “brown economy”, and towards sustainable 
practices that will result in “improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” (UNEP, 2011, 
p16). This will operate through, “Improvements in environmental valuation and 
policy analysis ... to ensure that markets and policies incorporate the full costs and 
benefits of environmental impacts” (ibid, p18). Environmental services that we 
previously took for granted as free of charge will be priced using a cost-benefit 
approach, and markets will be created in which to trade them. 
The authors of Towards a Green Economy attempt to resolve the two major 
challenges of our time, environmental degradation and persistent poverty, and their 
good intentions are evident in the report. However, their approach of using market 
mechanisms to overcome these challenges is inherently problematic. This paper is a 
critique of the green economy and the unstated assumptions on which it is based. 
The first section analyses the weaknesses of the green economy, both as an 
ideological concept and the obstacles to its practical implementation. The second 
section delves deeper into the discourse used to rationalize the green economy, 
which enables the wholesale commoditization of nature. 
 
2. Weaknesses of the Green Economy 
 
The green economy fails to address five fundamental problems and, thus, has 
the potential to increase environmental degradation and cause even greater social 
inequity than we see today: 
1. Ecosystem services are inherently difficult to price. 
2. The consideration of the rebound effect is insufficient. 
3. Primacy of economics over the environment is ensured. 
4. Markets offer little protection for the poorest people.  
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5. Existing market mechanisms aimed at safeguarding the environment 
have not succeeded.  
 
 
2.1 How Can We Accurately Price Natural Services?  
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report (MEA, 2005) was 
instrumental in highlighting the range of benefits bestowed on humans from natural 
processes, such as the purification of air and water, the cycling of nutrients, or the 
provision of food through the pollination of crops. Collectively these benefits are 
known as ecosystem services. According to the MEA report, sixty percent of the 
ecosystem services they assessed are being degraded by the aggregate impact of 
anthropogenic activities. As a result, there is an increasing likelihood that these 
ecosystems will experience nonlinear and potentially irreversible changes in how they 
function (ibid, p11). The degradation of ecosystems is preventing the Millennium 
Development Goals from being realized, and threatens the well being of all people, 
of both present and future generations (ibid, p14). The MEA report and other 
similar documents, such as the WWF’s Living Planet Report (2012), argue that we 
should be taking the utmost care of the world’s ecosystems, as our very existence 
depends on them. 
In recognition of these concerns UNEP proposed its strategy of a green 
economy, with two aspirations in mind. One is the removal of externalities, which 
are benefits or services received from ecosystems but are not paid for. The cost of 
damaging an ecosystem does not feature in economic decisions. The other objective 
is poverty alleviation, through the transfer of funds from the ‘users’ of environmental 
services, such as governments, companies or communities, to the ‘providers’, the 
rural poor whose livelihoods often depend on exploiting fragile ecosystems (UNEP, 
2011).  To achieve these objectives the green economy will use the mechanism of 
‘Payment for Ecosystem Services’ (PES), which operates by i) framing an ecological 
function as a ‘service’, ii) assigning it a price, and iii) creating a market to link those 
who affect, control or manage the provision of this service and those who are willing 
to pay for it (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010).  
A major criticism regarding this market-based approach is that our 
knowledge of how ecosystems function is entirely inadequate to contemplate such 
crude valuations. Even our most esteemed ecologists and natural historians assert 
that our understanding of our interaction with the natural world is, at best, scant 
(Attenborough, 2006; Hollings, 1998). Yet UNEP feels confident it can value 
pollination by insects at $190 billion/year (2011, p18). This figure is based on the 
‘bioeconomic approach’ proposed by Gallai et al. (2009), in which the market value 
of a crop is multiplied by its dependence ratio on pollinators in the nightmare 
scenario of “total pollinator loss”. The ethical issue of a world without bees aside, the 
fact remains that we are unable to provide most of these services for ourselves on 
any relevant scale, despite our impressive array of technologies. If we cannot 
substitute natural capital with physical capital, the weak sustainability approach 
advocated by UNEP becomes redundant. Even Gallai et al. concede that “ecological 
responses to pollinator decline on large scales remain poorly known” (2009, p.820). 
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Thus a reliance on economic formulae to protect ecosystems rather than heeding the 
warnings of the scientific community is a very risky strategy. 
 
2.2 The Rebound Effect Is Not Adequately Accounted For 
 
The pursuit of profit is the main driver behind innovation, and this usually 
results in technological processes that are more efficient in their use of natural 
resources. The unfortunate consequence is the rebound effect, whereby the efficiency 
gains are undermined by an increase in the use of the technology and the 
consumption of natural resources (Polimeni & Polimeni, 2006). The UK Energy 
Research Centre found that improved fuel efficiency in cars has led to people driving 
more frequently and further, or that the money saved from buying less petrol is 
spent on other energy-intensive goods and services, such as an overseas flight (2007).  
If pricing mechanisms are used to reduce environmental risks, there is a 
strong possibility for a rebound effect in all sectors. As the costs of damaging 
ecosystems are internalized through PES, the price of natural resources will rise, and 
goods will become more expensive. Companies hoping to gain a larger share of the 
market will then invest in more efficient technological processes to reduce their 
operating costs. This allows them to drop prices, thus generating higher demand. 
The reduced operating costs could make it profitable to extract more of the resource 
than before the introduction of PES. Kosoy et al. (2012) therefore argue that just 
shifting the supply curve is insufficient. We also need to focus on the dynamics of 
social behavior which influence the demand for goods. This need is explicitly 
recognized by UNEP, which asserts that new technologies should be accompanied 
by “appropriate behavioral and institutional change” to prevent such a rebound 
(2011, p359). While this recognition is welcome, UNEP does not explain anywhere 
in its 631 page report how the behavior of institutions or individuals might be 
changed, except for a brief reference to tax incentives and some unsubstantiated 
regulatory policies. This is a major oversight in the report. It is not enough to simply 
accept that the rebound effect may be a problem. There has to be clearer guidelines 
on how the green economy and its architects can avert a threat that could completely 
undermine their principle aim of protecting the environment. 
 
2.3 Primacy of Economics over the Environment Is Ensured 
 
Let’s consider for a moment the premise on which the green economy is 
based. When a price is put on a natural service, you can buy it. Corbera (2012) argues 
that this causes a fundamental shift in the logic of conservation. Ethical arguments 
regarding the protection of the environment, such as inter-generational justice or that 
nature has intrinsic value, are substituted for utilitarian ones that prioritize the 
elements of nature most useful to humans. While this raises important moral 
questions for consideration in developed countries, it also risks undermining the 
social norms of rural communities in developing countries. Gómez-Baggethun et al. 
(2010) observe that valuation processes are by no means ideologically neutral and can 
act as institutions that articulate particular notions of property and private 
ownership. There is a risk that in creating economic incentives for the protection of 
nature, market mechanisms can induce logics of individualism and competition in 
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societies previously structured upon community and reciprocity value (ibid). 
Traditional forms of nature stewardship, such as ethical obligation or communal 
regulation, could be supplanted by economic self-interest, thereby changing the way 
people relate to nature and to each other. 
The assumption that economic valuation will actually offer protection for the 
natural environment is in itself highly precarious, as McCauley observes:  
 
‘‘To make ecosystem services the foundation of our 
conservation strategies is to imply – intentionally or otherwise – that 
nature is only worth conserving when it is, or can be made, 
profitable. The risk in advocating this position is that we might be 
taken at our word. Then, if there is a ‘devaluation’ of nature… what 
are we to tell local stewards who have invested in our ideology, and 
how can we protect nature from liquidation?’’ (2006) 
 
As mentioned earlier, it will prove very difficult to accurately price ecosystem 
services. If the payment for conservation is considered insufficient to compensate 
for the opportunity cost, the value gained from choosing alternative options, then 
PES may actually be counterproductive in achieving its aims (Gómez-Baggethun et 
al., 2010). This negative outcome would be further compounded if other 
conservation strategies had been abandoned in favour of PES. Moreover, in leaving 
environmental protection to the whims of the market, we would do well to bear in 
mind that businesses do not have environmental protection as their primary aim. 
Milton Friedman (1970) famously said that businesses have only one social 
responsibility: the pursuit of profit. If a corporation can profit from destroying an 
ecosystem, without alienating its customers or shareholders in the process, the less 
scrupulous will certainly do so. The exploitation of the Athabasca oil sands in 
Canada is a poignant example. 
 
2.4 Nature for Those Who Can Afford It 
 
There are one billion malnourished people in the world today (UNCSD, 
2012, p4), despite productivity increases during the Green Revolution. UNCSD 
states that “poverty is the greatest global challenge facing the world today” (2012, 
p1), and so a failure to address it would undermine the legitimacy of the green 
economy. A major concern is that an unequal distribution of wealth can exist in a 
green economy just as easily as in a brown economy (Flomenhoft, 2011). The UNEP 
report (2011) repeatedly states the need to construct some sort of protection for the 
poor into the new economic policy. However, the report does not fully acknowledge 
the ability of market forces to swiftly harm livelihoods and the natural environment 
(Brockington, 2012). For instance, in less than a decade over 18 million hectares of 
primary rainforest in Indonesia have been cleared for highly lucrative biofuel 
production, leading to the severe impoverishment and disempowerment of the 
indigenous communities who lived there (Colbran, 2011). Moreover, this is not just a 
moral question of social justice. Wangari Maathai (2008) highlighted that poverty and 
inequality lead to conflict. This invariably results in environmental destruction and 
the lack of a democratic voice, which generates further poverty, and so on. If the 
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green economy does not succeed in alleviating poverty and inequality, attempts at 
protecting the natural environment will be severely hampered in many parts of the 
world. 
UNEP asserts that “a pro-poor orientation must be superimposed on any 
green economy initiative” (2011, p20). Imposing a pro-poor agenda onto the green 
economy will inevitably require strong governance and extensive intervention into 
the workings of global and national markets. There is a contradiction here, because 
the entire notion of the green economy is based on the prevailing neo-liberal 
paradigm of creating markets and allowing them to function freely, albeit with a 
possible kick-start from governments in the form of tax incentives. The scale of 
intervention required to ensure the green economy does not suffer from an ‘elite 
capture’ of the opportunities these new markets create would be considerable 
(Brockington, 2012). This bears more of a resemblance to welfare capitalism than a 
free market. Most governments have supported policies of market liberalization in 
recent decades, and so it seems unlikely that they would be willing to engage in such 
heavy interference in the markets at this time. 
 
2.5 The Failure of Carbon Markets 
 
The experience of Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms should serve as a warning to 
extending the use of markets into other areas of environmental protection. The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) hoped to 
stabilize global carbon emissions by imposing legally binding emission reductions on 
developed (Annex I) countries under the Kyoto Protocol. The flexible mechanisms 
are intended to help countries “meet their targets by reducing emissions or removing 
carbon from the atmosphere in other countries in a cost-effective way” (UNFCCC, 
2013). They allow countries to trade carbon emission allocations by purchasing 
‘permits’ from other Annex I countries or operators which have a surplus (cap and 
trade), or by buying ‘offset credits’ through investment in ‘emissions saving projects’ 
in developing (Non-Annex I) countries (the Clean Development Mechanism). 
The Kyoto flexible mechanisms are theoretically sound, but the reality is less 
encouraging. In April 2013 the world’s largest carbon market, the European Union 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), valued carbon at less than €3 per tonne (The 
Economist, 2013). This devaluation was primarily caused by the EU ETS allocation 
of free credits to large polluters based on their historical emissions, a practice known 
as ‘grandfathering’ (Coelho, R., 2012). There are now too many credits on the market 
for it to function properly. Ultimately, €3 per tonne is not a sufficient deterrent for 
large polluters such as energy companies to reduce their emissions. Even if the 
carbon markets do survive, their ability to prevent anthropogenic climate change 
remains doubtful. Since the markets were formally introduced in 2005, atmospheric 
carbon dioxide has increased from 379 to 398 ppm (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2013). Hansen et al. (2008) regard 350 ppm as the 
target we should aim for if we wish to maintain the relatively stable climate of the 
Holocene epoch, and so we are heading in the wrong direction. This illustrates that 
market mechanisms do not necessarily result in environmental protection despite the 
best intentions of those who design them.  
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Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) will most likely follow the model of 
the international climate policy REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation). REDD+ promotes the commoditization of forest 
ecosystems’ carbon storage and sequestration functions, whereby funds are 
transferred from carbon offset buyers to sellers in exchange for the sustainable 
management of forested areas (Corbera, 2012). It is too early to pass judgment on 
the success of REDD+, but the program has encountered problems such as slow 
funding from donor countries and the lack of institutional infrastructure in recipient 
countries to implement it (Clements, 2010). REDD+ has drawn criticism from 
indigenous people’s organizations, who claim that it is being used to undermine their 
fundamental rights and could potentially lead to a mass land grab (Espinoza Llanos 
and Feather, 2011). REDD+ pilot projects have had to surmount multiple 
challenges, such as negotiating different forms of land tenure-ship, building trust 
between diverse stakeholders, and accurately  monitoring and assessing  ecosystem 
services (Corbera, 2012). The complexity of embedding a market mechanism into the 
local context presents an acute challenge to the implementation of REDD+ and 
other forms of PES.  
 
3. The Commoditization of Nature 
 
3.1 Nature as a Fictitious Commodity 
 
UNCSD leaders hope to translate the function of ecosystem services into 
what Karl Polanyi (1944) calls fictitious commodities, so that they can be incorporated 
into global and local economies (Brockington, 2012). Real commodities, such as oil or 
timber, are physical items that exchange hands when sold. Fictitious commodities, 
such as land and labor, do not exchange hands when they are sold. Instead, complex 
social arrangements and political institutions, such as title deeds or employment 
contracts, are relied upon to transfer ownership or user rights (Polanyi, 1944). PES is 
an example of this arrangement. 
The commoditization of nature is by no means new. We have been buying 
and selling the fruits of nature’s bounty since the advent of money. What is different 
about the green economy, however, is its scope. Commoditization will now be 
extended into areas previously governed by other social institutions, such as 
protective legislation, community ownership, or regarded as sacred (Kosoy et al., 
2012). These social institutions have not always been successful in protecting the 
environment, but this is primarily because they were undermined by the same market 
forces that will now be expanded. In the green economy we will be entitled to buy 
clean air, fresh water, and healthy soil, so long as we have enough cash in our bank 
account. We are selling nature itself, not just the fruits it produces. 
This trepidation is accompanied by a more practical concern of how markets 
often perform poorly when allocating fictitious commodities and common goods. 
Brockington observes: 
 
Fictitious commodities like land and labor do not live easily in 
markets because the commodity form only captures part of their 
social existence. Markets do not recognize the emotive attachments 
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to homes and place, they do not recognize that labor is composed of 
people with identity, ambition, dreams and families” (2012, p420). 
 
When goods or services are defined as fictitious commodities, their social 
and ecological contexts are removed and a host of cultural and intrinsic values 
become obsolete. Polanyi did not mince his words when he argued “to allow the 
market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
natural environment...would result in the demolition of society” (1944, p76). 
 
3.2 The Rhetoric of the Green Economy 
 
The commoditization of nature is made possible because a discourse has 
been constructed which allows people to perceive it in monetary terms. This 
discourse has been promulgated by powerful elites since the time of philosopher 
Francis Bacon, who advocated binding “nature with all her children...to your service 
and make her your slave” (1603, cited in Farrington, 1964). That nature can be 
bought and sold is not, however, ontologically defined, but is a socially constructed 
reality which reflects a particular cultural and temporal context. The Plymouth 
colonists asked Massasoit, a leader of the Wampanoag Native American Nation, his 
views on selling land in the 1620s. He replied: 
  
"What is this you call property? It cannot be the earth, for the 
land is our mother, nourishing all her children, beasts, birds, fish and 
all men. The woods, the streams, everything on it belongs to 
everybody and is for the use of all. How can one man say it belongs 
only to him?" (cited in Batt, 2003). 
 
The language used by Massasoit clearly expresses a very different social 
reality to the one understood by the authors of Towards a Green Economy, who state 
that, “Ideally, changes in stocks of natural capital would be evaluated in monetary 
terms and incorporated into national accounts” (2011, p23). In describing the 
environment as ‘stocks of natural capital’, UNEP employs a worldview that 
Evernden (1993) refers to as ‘resourcism’, whereby nature is defined by its utility to 
humans. This legitimises the rationality of pricing ecosystem services, while 
simultaneously excluding discourses that reflect different worldviews, such as 
Massasoit’s ecocentricism. 
The representation of nature shapes and influences how environmental 
problems are understood and, thus, determines which potential solutions can be 
considered (Lindseth, 2006, p26). As a result, the discourse defines the space in 
which analysis of the problem can occur, and the worldview on which the discourse 
rests can remain unquestioned or even unidentified.	   In Towards a Green Economy 
(2011) the overwhelming voice is one of ‘ecological modernization’; that 
technological advancement will lead to a more efficient use of natural resources 
(Brockington, 2012). This has important implications, as Hajer explains, “The 
discursive power of ecological modernization manifests itself in the degree to which 
its implicit future scenarios permeate through society and actors re-conceptualize 
their interests and recognize new opportunities and new trouble spots” (1995, p261). 
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Ecological modernization is a persuasive discourse because it reframes 
economic growth and environmental protection as complementary and perhaps even 
mutually reinforcing. Not only does this appeal to powerful target audiences, such as 
policy makers and business leaders (Dryzek, 1997, p15), but it also helps allay the 
fears of an environmentally aware general public. The ‘trouble spots’ that concern 
people switch from ‘the possibility of ecological collapse’ to ‘what is the most 
appropriate technological fix?’ 
 
3.3 Our Faith in Progress 
 
UNEP’s Towards a Green Economy (2011) attempts to provide a road map for 
humanity, and it is based on the same assumptions as its predecessor Our Common 
Future (1987).  In 1983 the United Nations established the Brundtland Commission 
in response to two major concerns. One was the mounting evidence of 
environmental deterioration on regional scales resulting from industrialization, such 
as acid rain, deforestation, and the pollution of waterways. The other was the fear 
that economic and social development would soon be hindered by the scarcity of 
finite natural resources, as proposed by Donella Meadows et al. in their influential 
report ‘Limits to Growth’ (1972). Concern for the environment has escalated 
considerably in recent decades, and many of Meadows et al.’s predictions have 
proven to be remarkably accurate; the problems have not gone away (Bigg, 2011, 
p460). It is important to recognize that the Brundtland Commission and UNEP were 
both charged with answering the same questions, and they both came up with the 
exact same answer: economic growth. 
The Brundtland Commission acknowledged the necessity of political action 
to prevent further environmental degradation, but it somewhat sidestepped the 
‘limits to growth’ argument:  
 
“The concept of sustainable development does imply limits – 
not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of 
technology and social organization on environmental resources and 
by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human 
activities.” (The World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987, p7).  
 
Their conclusion was that we do not have ‘absolute limits’, but simply a few 
inconvenient ‘limitations’ which can be resolved by our own ingenuity. Towards a 
Green Economy (2011) toes the same line with its discourse of ecological 
modernization. 
Both reports feed into the well-established grand narrative of humanity’s 
inexorable march towards a brighter future, through progress. The unwavering belief 
that we can overcome any obstacle with the twin forces of scientific reasoning and 
technological innovation has pervaded our collective consciousness since the Age of 
Enlightenment. Christopher Lasch suggests, “Progressive optimism rests, at bottom, 
on a denial of the natural limits on human power and freedom, and it cannot survive 
for very long in a world in which an awareness of those limits has become 
inescapable” (1991, p530). This statement is particularly revealing. If the Brundtland 
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Commission had presented a different interpretation of sustainable development, 
one that accepted the possibility of absolute natural limits, Our Common Future (1987) 
would have raised serious doubts about the wisdom of pursuing economic growth as 
the main instrument of structuring our society. The three hundred year old dogma of 
progress would have to be refuted or, at the very least, subjected to a genuine re-
examination. We would be forced to admit that we had made a mistake, taken a 
wrong turn somewhere along the line. The Brundtland Commission was not 
prepared to take that step anymore than UNEP and the UNCSD leaders are willing 




Towards a Green Economy (2011) offers a very conservative vision of how 
humanity might achieve sustainable development. It relies heavily on the growth 
paradigm advocated in Our Common Future (1987), despite mounting evidence that 
this economic policy has accelerated environmental degradation at an exponential 
rate during the last twenty-five years (MEA, 2005; WWF, 2012) and that poverty 
remains prevalent in many countries (UNCSD, 2012). The green economy falls into 
the trap of placing economic growth as the goal of society, and therefore avoids the 
most essential question: what is the economy for? The proposal of ecological 
modernization does have some validity; switching to renewable energy, reducing 
pollution and avoiding the wasteful use of natural resources are all sensible, if not 
novel, suggestions. But the new risks introduced through the pricing of ecosystem 
services are of particular concern, as this ignores what Martínez-Alier (2002) calls 
‘incommensurability’; that many aspects of human existence and the natural 
environment cannot be adequately discussed in economic terms.  
So what are the alternatives? Albert Einstein reputedly once said, “the 
significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were 
at when we created them”. We are confronted by complex, multi-scale ecological and 
social problems, and the discourse of progress and technological invincibility is not 
serving us well, as it limits our capacity to conceive of solutions outside of the 
economic sphere. A humble recognition of our absolute dependence on the natural 
environment would alter our perspective immeasurably. It then becomes permissible 
to regard some ecosystem functions as so fundamentally important, both intrinsically 
and in a utilitarian sense, that they should be safeguarded through the most assured 
method possible. This lies not in standardised economic valuations, but in a range of 
context-specific measures, such as legal protection, proactive conservation, existing 
local institutions, and research into socio-ecological interactions. Shifting the 
discourse would also encourage individuals and communities to examine the logic of 
consumption and re-evaluate what is most important in our societies (Jackson, 2009). 
This self-reflection would most likely lead to a moral enquiry into global inequality. 
Governments would be called upon to regulate exploitative business practices and 
oversee meaningful wealth redistribution without the hindrance of economic growth 
as the overriding goal. This process of social change will not be easy, but it is driven 
by necessity. It begins with the acceptance that nature is something more than a 
form of capital to be traded. 
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